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Abstract
While Rational Expectations have dominated the paradigm of expectations formation,
they have been more recently challenged on the empirical ground such as, for
instance, in the dynamics of the exchange rate. This challenge has led to the
introduction of heterogeneous expectations in economic modeling. More specifically,
the forecasts of the market participants have been drawn from competing views. Two
behaviours are usually considered: agents are either fundamentalist or chartist.
Moreover, the possibility of switching from one behaviour to the other one is also
assumed.
In a simple cobweb model, we study the dynamics associated with different
endogenous switching process based on the path of prices. We provide an example
with an asymmetric endogenous switching process built on the dynamics of past
prices. This example confirms the widespread belief that fundamentalist market
behaviour as compared with that of chartist tends to promote market stability.
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2Heterogeneous Beliefs and Instability
1. Introduction
It is well known that in economics and finance, expectations play a key role in
modeling dynamic phenomena. The empirical literature demonstrates that very
often the macroeconomics fundamentals are not able to explain the large and
persistent movements of some economic variables such as securities prices or
exchange rates. A famous example is given by the large appreciation of the
USD between 1980 and 1985. There is a wide agreement in explaining that
this appreciation came from an increased demand for USD but there is no
agreement about why investors suddenly found US assets more attractive than
others. In fact, neither models based on economic fundamentals, nor simple
time-series models, nor the forecasts of market participants as reflected in the
forward discount or in survey data, seem to be able to give good predictions.
Even after the fact, the proportion of exchange rate movements that can be
explained is very low.
Frankel and Froot (1990a) recalled that three explanations had been given.
Firstly, the «safe haven hypothesis» attributed the shift in demand to an
increase in the perceived safety of US assets relative to other countries assets.
Secondly, according to the speculative bubble hypothesis, there was a self-
confirming increase in the expected rate of USD appreciation. Thirdly, the
monetarist explanation was based on fundamentals. USD appreciated either
because the expected inflation rate differential increased or because the real
3interest rate differential increased. Even if the latter explanation appeared to be
the best one, it was not very powerful in explaining the path taken by the
USD. As a consequence, a number of researchers have deviated from
economic models based upon fundamentals, i.e. from the Rational
Expectations (RE) paradigm.
Following the seminal papers by Muth (1961) and Lucas (1971), the RE
hypothesis has dominated the paradigm in expectations formation. Under this
specification, agents’ subjective expectations equal the objective mathematical
expectations conditional on available information. The RE hypothesis includes
in fact two joined assumptions. On the one hand, agents are assumed to have a
perfect knowledge of “the economic model”, i.e. of the underlying market
equilibrium equations. On the other hand, they are assumed to use this model
to compute the RE forecast. Both assumptions have been challenged.
Indeed, the literature on bounded rationality has put forward two important
criticisms. It is unrealistic to assume that agents know the “economic model”;
it seems more reasonable to assume that their expectations are based on time-
series observations. It has been shown that, in several economic areas,1 naive
forecasting tends to give more accurate predictions than forecasts based on
models even if it cannot as a rule predict turning point. Moreover, even if the
agents know the underlying economic model, something else is necessary to
obtain the RE. Indeed, the agents also need to have perfect knowledge about
                                                          
1 See for instance Witt and Witt, 1995, pp 469-470.
4the beliefs of all the other agents in the economy to coordinate their actions on
the same RE equilibrium.
Challenging the RE hypothesis leads to two questions.
The first question is how we should model expectations given the fact that it is
hard to observe or obtain information about individual expectations in real
markets. Of course in theory two polar cases exist: we may assume either full
rationality with agents deriving optimal forecast from economic theory or
bounded rationality with agents only observing time-series and using simple
habitual rule of thumb predictors. Several authors such as Frankel and Froot
(1990a, 1990b) answered to this question in creating a new research area
where it is assumed that the forecasts of the market participants are drawn
from competing views, i.e. heterogeneous expectations are introduced in
economic modeling.
The second question is whether heterogeneity in expectations does contribute
to excess price volatility as that observed in stock market or exchange rate. In
other words, the question is whether agents are able to learn and coordinate on
a RE equilibrium in a heterogeneous world.
The aim of this paper is to study the links between heterogeneous beliefs and
stability. The paper is organised as follows. Two typical behaviours, namely
fundamentalist and chartist, are described in section 2. In section 3 we survey
the literature which explains why and how the weight of each behaviour may
5change over time. In section 4, using a simple cobweb economy, we obtain
different dynamical paths according to assumptions on the forecasting rules
and the weighting.
2. Fundamentalists vs. Chartists
Many heterogeneous agents models assume that two kinds of agents exist. The
question that arises is on which criteria we could distinguish between both
groups of agents.
In fact, besides and even before the RE paradigm, it has long been remarked
that if there exists traders who tend to forecast by extrapolating recent trends,
i.e. traders who have bandwagon expectations or herd behaviour, then their
actions can exacerbate swings in the price. Evidence from survey data shows
that at short horizons, respondents tend to forecast by extrapolating recent
trends while at long horizons they tend to forecast a return to a long-run
equilibrium. One way of distinguishing empirically between the shorter and
the longer-term expectations is to examine the weight survey respondents
place on past prices in forming their expectations at different time horizons.
Frankel and Froot (1990b) considered three standard models of expectations -
extrapolative, regressive, and adaptative- and in all three cases, short-term and
long-term expectations behave very differently from one another. Therefore,
they associated the longer-term expectations, which are consistently
6stabilizing, with the fundamentalists,2 and the short-term forecasts, which
seem to have a destabilizing nature, with the chartists.3
While it seems to be correct that chartist behaviour is more likely to be
destabilizing than fundamentalism, in some cases both behaviours are
consistent with stability. This appears for instance in the naive cobweb model
when the supply curve shows less responsive than the demand curve to price,
chartist, i.e. projectionist behaviour results in market stability.4
The behaviour of both groups can be explained in two ways.
First, both groups behave in different manner because they have different
information sets. Therefore, each agent is acting rationally subject to certain
constraints. The information set of fundamentalists includes fundamentals;
thus they base their expectations according to a model that consists of
fundamentals. For chartists, their information set contains only the time-series
of the expected variable, e.g. the price. So, they use the past history of the
price to detect patterns into which they extrapolate the future. However, in this
explanation, information is considered as static while it is dynamic, i.e. it may
not be considered as given. Indeed, motives influence the type and amount of
information gathered. In other words, fundamentalists often collect different
types of information to chartists.
                                                          
2 Fundamentalists are also called arbitrageurs.
3 Chartists are also called projectionists, technical analysts, bandwagon traders or
noise traders.
7The second way extends the previous analysis and so is better than it. Even
when agents have the same information set they may act differently. This may
be the case because either they draw a different set of inferences from the
same information set or they have different goals, including different attitudes
to contending with risk or uncertainty.
Fundamentalists look for fundamental determinants of the price. They
calculate an equilibrium price consistent with these fundamentals, and expect
that the current price will gradually move towards its equilibrium value:
( )11 −− −+= ttft p*pfppˆ
where ftpˆ  is the period t price expected by fundamentalists, ( )•f  is an
increasing function and *p  is the equilibrium price.
In the simplest case, they predict that the price will always be equal to the RE
equilibrium steady state price, i.e. *ppˆ ft = .
Chartists base their forecasts on technical analysis, which is mainly a study of
past prices to detect patterns that can be projected in the future. They use
various extrapolative models that can be summarised under the following
general formulation: ( )...,p,ppˆ ttct 21 −−= φ
                                                                                                                                                       
4 See Lasselle, Svizzero, and Tisdell, 2001.
8where ctpˆ  is the period t price expected by chartists, ( )•φ  is an unspecified
function.
In the simplest case chartists have naive expectations which represent a rule of
thumb forecasting rule, i.e. 1−= t
c
t ppˆ .
3. Switching between fundamentalists and chartists
The change in the price expected by the market can be written as a weighted
average of the two groups’ expectations: ( ) cttfttt pˆpˆpˆ αα −+= 1
where [ ]10,t ∈α  is the weight associated with fundamentalists and ( )tα−1  the
weight of chartists. If tα  is constant over time, this means that the weight of
the two groups remains the same and also that switching is impossible, i.e. it is
not possible for a fundamentalist to become a chartist and vice versa.
However, much evidence supports the possibility of switching.
Indeed, Frankel and Froot (1990a) recalled that theories as well as practice
confirm the possibility of switching. On the one hand, the model of
speculative bubbles says that over the period 1981-1985, the market shifted
weight away from fundamentalists and toward chartists. On the other hand, the
Euromoney Magazine showed from a survey on techniques used by
forecasting services that from 1978 to 1988, the positions between
fundamentalists and chartists were reversed. In both cases this shift explained
the USD pattern during the period.
9Once the weighting is admitted to be able to vary, it remains to explain how it
could change. Several strategies have been adopted.
The first strategy consists of stochastic switching.
Vigfusson (1996) noted that this weighting is unobserved, and then the model
could not be estimated or tested using standard techniques. To overcome these
difficulties and to test the model, he used Markov regime-switching
techniques. He defined the two groups’ different methods of forecasting as
regimes and rewrote the model as a regime-switching model. Kaizoji (1999)
also used transition probabilities. Indeed, he considered that it was not
possible to get information on the expectations formation and decision-making
of all the traders. Therefore and according to the synergetic approach, he
treated heterogeneous agents as a statistical ensemble.
The second strategy is based on endogenous switching. Several cases are
possible.
The first case provided by Frankel and Froot (1990b) is simple and obvious.
Portfolio managers are considered to be the only persons who actually buy and
sell on the market. They form their expectations as a weight average of
chartists and fundamentalists. Therefore, they update the weights over time
according to whether the fundamentalists or the chartists have recently been
doing the better forecasting. In other words, the weights that the market gives
to the two groups change over time, according to the groups’ respective
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wealths. The 1981-85 shift was then a natural Bayesian response to the
inferior forecasting record of fundamentalists.
This idea may be simply formalised by assuming, as Hommes (1999) did, that
prediction rules are updated according to past realised profits. So, there is an
evolutionary competition between different forecasting rules and we get:
t
f
tt Zexp = −1πβα
where ft 1−π  are the net realised profits in period t-1 by fundamentalists,
( )ctftt expexpZ 11 −− += βπβπ  is a normalization factor so that all fractions
add up to one, β  is the intensity of choice, measuring how fast agents switch
between different prediction strategies.
If β  equals zero, then all fractions are fixed over time. When β  tends to
infinity, then all agents choose the optimal predictor in each period.
The second case is derived from Frankel and Froot (1990a) and from the
empirical observation that the relative weight of the two groups depends on
the forecasting horizons. For shorter forecasting horizons, more weight is
placed on chartists while the opposite is true for longer forecasting horizons.
Bask (1998) considered that, on the one hand, the more uncertain the economy
is, the shorter the forecasting horizon is. On the other hand, he pointed out that
uncertainty is associated with an inflationary economy. By transitivity, the
forecasting horizon depends inversely on the inflation rate.
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Then, we get the weight of fundamentalists as a proxy of the forecasting
horizon: ( )[ ]εα +=
−−
2
211 ttt pp  where ε  is positive and small.
When the prices are stable, the forecasting horizon is almost infinite and
fundamentalistst are dominant; the horizon is myopic if prices are highly
unstable.
Even if it is true that agents who remain chartists do work on a shorter
horizon, Bask’s analysis is however a little bit dubious. Indeed, the usual way
to deal with uncertainty is that a higher proportion of individuals become
fundamentalists.
The third case comes from De Grauwe et al. (1993) and has been adapted in
several cases, see Federici and Gandolfo (2000). Although fundamentalists
have the same wealth and the same degree of risk aversion, they are assumed
to have heterogeneous expectations normally distributed around the
equilibrium price *p . When *ppt =−1 , half of the fundamentalists finds
that the price is too low and the other half finds it too high, compared to their
own estimates. Therefore, the demand of the former is exactly matched by the
supply of the latter. In that case, fundamentalists do not influence the price, i.e.
0=tα . When the price deviates from the equilibrium value (in one sense or
the other), the two groups of fundamentalists are numerically different so their
excess demand is not nil and then they influence the price. Their weight is thus
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an increasing function of the deviation of the price from its equilibrium value:
( )  −+−= − 21111 *tt ppβα .
It should be noted that in that case, the weighting changes in a symmetrically
manner, which is for sure, a strong assumption.
Most models (based on any switching function) conclude that heterogeneity
may cause expectations driven excess price volatility, including chaos. In fact,
chaos is possible in a model when the latter has a property of «sensitive
dependance on initial conditions»: any two solutions paths with arbitrarely
close but not equal starting values diverge at exponential rates. Therefore the
future development of the price is essentially unpredictable despite the fact
that the underlying model is deterministic and that the solution paths remain
within a bounded set.
4. Linear Cobweb dynamics
In this section, we consider the simple cobweb model, i.e. we study the
dynamical path of prices on the market for a good. Even if this model is quite
simple, it has become a classical example in economic dynamics. Indeed,
adaptative as well as rational expectations were first introduced in this model.
In this section, we assume for simplicity that the supply and demand functions
are linear (this assumption is removed in the next section).
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The demand function is defined by ( ) tt pbapD −=  where a, b are both
positive parameters. The supply function is defined by ( ) tt pdcpS ˆˆ +−=
where c, d are both positive parameters. Note that that price expectations
denoted by tpˆ  are introduced through the producers' behavior.
The stationary equilibrium price is denoted by *p . It corresponds to a REE if
at any period we have tt pp =ˆ . In our case, we can easily compute the
equilibrium price ( ) ( )dbcap ++=*  and the equilibrium quantity
( ) ( )dbbcadq +−=* .
Let us define by ( )•ψ  the expectations function of the producers. This
expectations function may depend on the future, current or past prices and it
may also include the equilibrium value of the price.
The equilibrium price *p  is said to be stationary invariant through the
expectations if for any ( )•ψ  we have ( ) **,...*, ppp =ψ .
We now need to specify the expectations function in order to study the
dynamics of the cobweb. It will allow us to establish the link between market
stability and the weight of the chartists. Consider a linear expectations
function of the equilibrium price and of the price of the previous period, i.e.
( ) ( ) 11 1**, −− −+= tt pppp ααψ .
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With our specification, *p  is stationary invariant through the expectation for
any value of α . Our dynamical study can be made according to the value
taken by α . The two polar cases can first be distinguished and then the
intermediary case.
When 0=α , all the producers are chartists (like in the traditional cobweb
model), i.e. they form their expectations on the previous price. The supply
function is upward sloping. The price dynamics is then given by
1−−
+
= tt pb
d
b
cap . The equilibrium price is still equal to
( ) ( )dbcap ++=*  and it is unstable if bd > .
When 1=α , all the producers are fundamentalists, i.e. they believe that the
current price is always equal to its equilibrium value. The supply function has
a slope equal to zero; at any price, the producers are willing to sell a constant
output equal to ( ) ( )dbbcadq +−=* . It is remarkable to note that the
stationary equilibrium is stable for any values of the parameters.
When 10 << α , both types of producers are on the market. The weight of
both groups is linked to the value of α . The higher α  is, the bigger the
proportion of chartists is. The price dynamics is then defined by:
( ) ( ) 11* −−−−+= tt pb
d
b
pdcap αα .
The stability of the stationary equilibrium *p  depends on the (constant) slope
of the dynamics equal to ( )α−− 1
b
d . Therefore, even when bd > , the
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equilibrium may be stable5 if α  is large enough. Indeed, for any α  less than
( )db−1 , the equilibrium is unstable; it is stable for any α  larger than
( )db−1 . In the special case where db−=1α , a two-period cycle occurs in
the neighborhood of the equilibrium price.
We can summarize our results in the following graph.
From this simple model with linear demand and supply functions we can
easily deduce that the dynamics is closely related to expectations (as well as
the parameters which reflect technology and preferences considered as given).
We have shown that the stability conditions of the equilibrium are directly
linked to the weight of both groups of producers, namely the weight of
chartists relative to the weight of fundamentalists. Indeed, when the number of
fundamentalists increases, market stability tends to be promoted.
It remains to study whether this result still holds for a non linear supply
function which would thereafter allow us to make α  endogenous.
                                                          
5 As we have previously shown, the equilibrium is unstable when all producers are
chartists and that this condition is met.
p
q
*q 1=αS
0=αS
dbS −=1α
ba( )α
α
−
−
1
*
d
pdc
( )tpD
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5. Non linear Cobweb dynamics
Our framework is based on the basic cobweb model derived from Hommes
(1999). While the demand function is still linear the supply function is not.
The linear demand function is defined by ( ) tt pBApD −=  where B,A  are
both positive parameters. The supply curve is S-shaped and equals
( ) ( ) 11 1 +−= dtt pˆpˆS , where d  is an odd integer. Such a supply curve can
be easily derived from an increasing and convex cost function given by at least
a third order polynomial.
When the expectations are not specified, the dynamics is given by:
( )[ ]d/tt pˆBBAp 1111 −−−=                                                                  (1)
When tt ppˆ = , there is perfect foresight and we can then compute the rational
expectations steady state denoted by *p . A convenient feature of the cobweb
model is the uniqueness of the RE equilibrium. In the sequel we simulate the
cobweb model for different specification of the expectations functions.
First let us assume that expectations are homogeneous. More specifically let us
say these expectations are naive or myopic, i.e. when 1−= tt ppˆ , (1) becomes:
( )[ ]d/tt pBBAp 11 111 −−−= −
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In this case, there is a single group of agents and therefore no switching
function. Depending on the values of the parameters ( )dBA ,, , the REE is
stable (see Figure 1 in the Appendix) or unstable.
Second let us assume that expectations are heterogeneous. In this case, two
groups of agents coexist: the chartists and the fundamentalists. Each group has
his own way to formulate expectations:6
- Chartists have myopic expectations: 1−= tt ppˆ ,
- Fundamentalists consider that the expected price is always equal to the
steady state price: *ppˆt = .
Following Hommes (1999) we assume that the weighting of both groups is
exogenous. We denote by [ ]10,∈α  the weight associated with fundamentalists.
(1) becomes:
( )( )[ ]d/tt *ppBBAp 11 1111 −+−−−= − αα                                       (2)
We simulate (2) for a broad range values of parameters A, B and d and also for
different weighting, i.e. for various values of α .
In any case, the REE is unique. Depending on the values of the parameters
( )α,,, dBA , this REE can be either stable or unstable.
                                                          
6 Many expectations functions are consistent with both behaviours, we consider the
simplest functions.
18
Consider first the case of a stable REE. If there are initially few
fundamentalists, it remains stable7 when the weight of fundamentalists
increases. However, when the REE is initially unstable8 for a low α , as soon
as the weight of fundamentalists increases, a two-period cycle emerges.
Thereafter the REE becomes stable for higher values of α .
The simulations results show that fundamentalists play a role in stabilizing the
economy. So, it remains to be shown if the same stabilizing effect is
associated with the increasing weight of fundamentalists for any endogenous
switching function.
Following Federici and Gandolfo (2000), we now assume that the switching is
endogenous and symmetric. (1) is becoming:
( )( )[ ]d/tttt *ppBBAp 11 1111 −+−−−= − αα                                     (3)
and the switching process, based on the deviation of the price from its
equilibrium value, is defining by:
( )211
11
*ppt
t
−+
−=
−
β
α .
As soon as the current price is far from the REE price, the weight of chartists
decreases. It is important to note that this process is symmetric, i.e. the
                                                          
7 See Figure 2 in the Appendix where the dynamical path of prices is drawn for a
given value of α .
8 The instability is provided by the values of the other parameters, namely ( )dBA ,, .
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elasticity of the weighting w.r.t. the price deviation remains the same whatever
the sign of the deviation.
From the simulations results we deduce the following (given values of the
parameters9). If the REE is stable10 (respectively unstable) for a given initial
value of alpha, then it remains stable (respectively unstable) for any α . In
other words, the switching does not influence the stability conditions. More
specifically, the weight of fundamentalists does not imply the stabilizing effect
that appears in the exogenous switching case.
This apparently strange result may be explained by the features of the
switching function. Indeed, it appears that, when evaluated at the equilibrium
price *p , this function is equal to zero and therefore it may not have an
influence on the slope of the dynamics.
Given the previous result, it appears necessary to keep an endogenous
switching process but to remove its symmetry.
Recall that at any period, we must have [ ]10,t ∈α  and the dynamics of prices
is still given by (3).
Our switching process, based on the fluctuations of past prices, is now
asymmetric. Its specification depends on a given evolution of past prices.
When past prices increased, few number of fundamentalists may turn to be
                                                          
9 However, the results hold for any β .
10 See Figure 3 in the Appendix.
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chartist. When there is a downward trend in prices, a large number of chartists
may turn to be fundamentalist.
In our simulations, the following asymmetric specification of tα  has been
chosen:
When the past prices increased ( 021 >− −− tt pp ), there are more chartists, i.e.
tα  decreases, but we assume that tα decreases slowly.
When the past prices decreased ( 021 <− −− tt pp ), there are less chartists, i.e.
tα increases, but we assume that tα increases faster.
Consequently, the dynamics of the weighting is clearly asymmetric.
For ease of understanding, let us introduce the following notations:
21 −− −= tt ppx  and 1−−= tty αα  and draw a diagram of our specification.
x
y
y=-x
Each branch of the lines represents the switching process and is given by:
21
( )ε+−= 1xy
with γε −=  if 0>x ,
and with γε 1=  if 0<x ,
and in both cases [ ]10,∈γ .
The dynamics now includes two dynamical variables (the weighting and the
price). We deal with a two-dimensional dynamical system described by:
- the dynamics on prices (3)
- the dynamics on tα  (i.e. the switching process).
The results from simulations are the following.11 For any values of the
parameters, the unique REE is stable. On the transition path, the values taken
by tα  are increasing, i.e. the stability is associated with an increase of the
weight of fundamentalists.
6. Concluding comments
In a simple cobweb model we have shown that the introduction of
heterogeneous beliefs and of the possibility of switching of behaviour allow
the economy to shift from instability to stability. This shift is attributed to the
increase of the weight of fundamentalists in the case of an exogenous
switching. While we have focused our attention on how the weight of each
group influences the stability/instability result, it should be noted that it will
also have an impact on the speed of convergence to the REE.
                                                          
11 See Figure 4 in the Appendix.
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When we have considered an endogenous and symmetric switching process,
the economy may remain unstable.
However, when the endogenous switching process is asymmetric and based on
past prices, then stability is always obtained and is associated with an increase
of the number of fundamentalists. This latter result confirms the widespread
belief that fundamentalist market behaviour as compared with that of chartist
tends to promote market stability.
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Appendix
In the following simulations, the values of the parameters are:
A = 2.5, B = 0.2, and d = 5. Please note that the initial price is denoted by
1p where 1 is the initial period of time.
Figure 1: homogeneous expectations
531 .p =
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
1.5
2.5
3
3.5
Prices Path
Value of the REE, p* = 2.26189.
Figure 2: heterogeneous expectations and exogenous switching process
Let 70.=α  and 3618921 .p =
4 6 8 10
2.24
2.26
2.28
2.32
2.34
2.36
Prices Path
Value of the REE, p* = 2.26189.
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Figure 3: heterogeneous expectations and endogenous symmetric switching
process
Let 30.=β  and 3618921 .p =
4 6 8 10
2.225
2.25
2.275
2.3
2.325
2.35
Prices Path
Value of the REE, p* = 2.26189
Figure 4: heterogeneous expectations and endogenous asymmetric switching
process
50.=γ , 221 .p = , 422 .p = , 102 .=α
p* = 2.26189
2 3 4 5 6 7
2.25
2.3
2.35
2.4
Prices Path
Prices Path: {2.2, 2.4, 2.18398, 2.26526, 2.26163, 2.26191, 2.26189}
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2 3 4 5 6
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
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0.9
Alpha Path
Values of the weighting taken on the path: {0.4, 0.3, 0.948047, 0.907411,
0.91828, 0.918142, 0.918199, 0.918198, 0.918198}
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